---
slug: paper-von-neumann-j-1944-theory-of-games-and-economic-behavior-with-o-morgenstern
title: von Neumann and Morgenstern: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944)
canonical: https://miscsubjects.com/a/paper-von-neumann-j-1944-theory-of-games-and-economic-behavior-with-o-morgenstern
---

## What the subject saw and its core results

John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944. They modeled economic decisions as strategic interactions between rational agents. The core result is a mathematical framework for games with defined payoffs. Agents choose strategies to maximize expected outcomes under uncertainty.

The work establishes the minimax theorem for zero-sum games. In such games, one player maximizes minimum payoff while the other minimizes maximum loss. Mixed strategies allow equilibrium where neither gains by unilateral deviation.

It also introduces von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility. Preferences over lotteries satisfy axioms of completeness, transitivity, continuity, and independence. This yields a utility function unique up to positive linear transformation. Optimal choice maximizes expected utility.

## Exact primary works and passages

The primary source is von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press. Later editions appeared in 1947 and 1953.

Standard formulations appear throughout. The minimax result is presented for two-person zero-sum games. Expected utility axioms are stated in the sections on utility theory.

No page-specific verbatim passages are cited here because direct verification from an open digital edition is not available in the checked sources. The book itself serves as the reference.

## Convergence patterns touched

The work touches symmetry in payoff structures. It models flow networks through repeated interactions and strategy choices. Bounded patterns appear in equilibrium outcomes that constrain possible results.

It evidences memory through repeated play and learning of opponent strategies. Scale invariance shows in the abstraction from specific payoffs to general utility functions.

These patterns align with structural regularities in strategic domains.

## Which patterns support or attack the OIP/GRAIN synthesis

The framework supports the synthesis by formalizing bounded rational interactions. Strategic choices produce stable structures under defined rules. This matches patterns of symmetry and flow networks in decision systems.

It provides a mechanistic layer for cooperation models. Repeated games and equilibria can extend to evolutionary stable strategies.

It attacks full synthesis claims by limiting scope to rational agents with complete information preferences. The model stays at the level of structured interactions and does not address emergence of life or mind.

See /a/oip-the-ladder for the progression from structure to memory to life.

## Distance from the full synthesis

The distance is substantial. The synthesis includes the Ladder from difference through flow, structure, memory, life, and mind. The book supplies formal tools for the structure and memory stages in social and economic domains. It stops short of biological or cognitive emergence.

The Mirror Layer places the observer inside the system. Game theory models agents as external calculators. It does not incorporate self-reference or the reader inside the modeled system.

## Honest limits and disconfirming edges

The axioms assume perfect rationality and consistent preferences. Human behavior often violates independence and transitivity. Allais paradox and Ellsberg paradox provide counterexamples.

The initial focus is two-person zero-sum games. Non-zero-sum and multi-player extensions require additional concepts such as Nash equilibrium, developed later.

The model treats information as complete or probabilistic. It does not address incomplete information or bounded computational capacity without further development.

Reductionist objections note that real economies involve institutions, norms, and path dependence not captured by abstract games. These edges remain disconfirming for claims of universal applicability.

## Claims

The article contains the following atomic claims.

## Sources
