---
slug: oip-node-c22-commons-institutional-design
title: Node C22: Commons / Institutional Design
canonical: https://miscsubjects.com/a/oip-node-c22-commons-institutional-design
---

# Node C22: Commons / Institutional Design

C22 — Commons / Institutional Design
{
  "id": "C22",
  "claim": "Groups can sustainably manage shared resources without top-down coercion or full privatization, when specific design principles (Ostrom's rules) are met; institutional structure, not resource type, determines commons success.",
  "domain": ["economics", "political science", "law", "ecology", "game theory"],
  "pattern": ["commons", "institutional_design", "collective_action", "self_governance", "polycentricity"],
  "mechanism": "Ostrom's eight design principles: (1) clearly defined boundaries, (2) proportional equivalence between benefits and costs, (3) collective-choice arrangements, (4) monitoring, (5) graduated sanctions, (6) conflict-resolution mechanisms, (7) minimal recognition of rights to organize, (8) nested enterprises for larger systems. These principles enable cooperation in repeated games with reputation and reciprocity.",
  "scale": "group → institution",
  "claim_tier": "T1",
  "sources": [
    "Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge.",
    "Ostrom, E. (2009). 'Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems.' Nobel Lecture.",
    "Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books.",
    "Hardin, G. (1968). 'The Tragedy of the Commons.' Science, 162, 1243-1248. [The problem statement.]"
  ],
  "dual": "Tragedy of the commons — open-access resources depleted by uncoordinated rational actors; captured institution — common resource controlled by a narrow group for private benefit.",
  "falsifier": "Ostrom's design principles systematically failing to predict commons outcomes — cases where all eight principles are met yet the commons fails, or where none are met yet it succeeds sustainably.",
  "rival_frame": "Commons success is exceptional. Most common-pool resources require either centralized state management or privatization (Hardin's original claim). Ostrom's cases are small-scale, homogeneous communities that do not scale to modern complex societies. Her principles are post-hoc descriptive, not predictive.",
  "independence_check": "MODERATE-HIGH. Hardin (biology, UCSB, 1968) stated the tragedy as a general principle. Axelrod (political science, Michigan, 1984) derived cooperation from iterated Prisoner's Dilemma independently. Ostrom (political science, Indiana, 1990) developed her principles from extensive fieldwork across fisheries, irrigation systems, and forests worldwide. Axelrod and Ostrom were aware of each other's work (partial lineage), but the fieldwork findings were independent of game theory.",
  "pattern_type": "social",
  "maps_to_axiom": ["A4", "A3"]
}

---

## Corpus map
- Same node, other planes: [Encyclopedia C22](/a/convergence-encyclopedia-c22) · [Inventory invariant](/a/oip-invariant-19-319-commons-institutional-design-the-social-scale-grain)
- Catalogue hub: [Public Article](/a/oip-convergence-public-article) · [Schema](/a/oip-convergence-schema)
